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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of her successive petition
for post conviction relief because the court dismissed the petition on different
grounds than those provided in the notice of intent to dismiss.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case has a long and tortured history as explained by the district court
in its Amended Order Dismissing Successive Petition (hereinafter Amended
Order):
On November 4, 1999, Petitioner Sandra Jonas was sentenced to a
unified term of life in prison with a fixed term of twenty-five years
upon a plea of guilty to second degree murder in Jerome County
Case No. CR-FE-1998-162. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence, which was denied by the district
court. Petitioner then appealed her conviction, sentence, and the
denial of her Rule 35 motion. On December 15, 2000, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's conviction, sentence, and
denial of the Rule 35 motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for
rehearing and a petition for review with the Supreme Court. Both
were denied, at which point the judgment became final. The Court
of Appeals issued its Remittitur to the district court on April 18,
2001. Petitioner filed an I.C.R. 34 motion for a new trial on October
29, 2001 followed by an alternative motion for leave to withdraw her
guilty plea. Two evidentiary hearings were held on Petitioner's
motion to withdraw her plea. She filed her first petition for postconviction relief on April 23, 2002 in Jerome County Case No. CV2002 1536. On May 10, 2004, her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea was denied because the evidence she presented did not
amount to "manifest injustice." Petitioner appealed that decision
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, although on
different grounds, on June 30, 2006. Petitioner filed a petition for
review, which was denied, and a remittitur was issued on April 19,
2006. Then, on August 26, 2008, following a hearing, the district
court issued its Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
in Jerome County Case No. CV-2002-1536.
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Petitioner appealed that dismissal on the grounds that the district
court erred by summarily dismissing her petition because she
raised genuine issues of material fact that she received ineffective
assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was involuntary (and
that the plea was involuntary without first being afforded notice). In
an unpublished opinion dated April 14, 2010, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's summary dismissal on the grounds that
Petitioner's petition and supporting materials "contained only bare
and conclusory allegations which the district court was not required
to accept." A remittitur was issued on June 29, 2010.
Amended Order, p. 1-2. (R. p. 121-122.)
As to the procedure of the instant post conviction, the district court
explained as follows:
Finally, on May 12, 2011, Petitioner filed the current successive
petitioner for post-conviction relief (Jerome County Case No. CV2011-559). On May 2, 2012, following the Court's Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, which granted Petitioner's request for court-appointed
counsel, Petitioner filed her Amended Successive Petition for Post
Conviction Relief, followed by a Verified Amended Successive
Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed on June 12, 2012, with
leave from the Court. Thereafter, on June 13, 2012, the State filed
its Answer to Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction
Relief.
Petitioner's original successive petition stated eighteen grounds for
post-conviction relief, many of which had already been raised in
prior motions or were not actionable claims under the Uniform Post
Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA). The original petition was
supported only by Petitioner's statement of facts. This Court
addressed the original successive petition in its Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, which is incorporated herein by reference. The Amended
Petition condensed these claims into one multi part claim of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, which will be
addressed in this opinion.
Amended Order, p. 2-3 (footnote omitted). (R. p. 122-123.)
The court ultimately dismissed the amended successive petition. (R. p.
128.) As part of the order, the court also issued a Rule 54(b) certificate directing
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that the order shall be a final judgment upon which an appeal can be taken. (R.
p. 130.)
Petitioner timely appeals. (R. p. 132.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied the successive post
conviction relief petition on grounds different than those contained in the notice of
intent to dismiss.
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ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE POSTCONVICTION RELIEF PETITION ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS THAN THOSE
IN THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS

A

Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal
An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is

civil in nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action
which led to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994).

In

order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which the request for postconviction relief is based. Id.
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho
759 (Ct.App. 1991 ).

Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed

true for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be
held. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994).

If the allegations do not

frame a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily
dismiss, but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly
granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to
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petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief.

Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995).
B.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).

The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result." Id. at 686.

Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in
order to be entitled to relief.

The defendant must demonstrate both that his

counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau,
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).

C.

The Claims and the Court's Rulings
As explained in the Court's Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss

Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to I.C. 19-4906, Order for
Return of Property, and Order Granting Motion for a Court Appointed Attorney
(hereinafter Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss), the pro se Petitioner raised
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what the court characterized as 18 grounds for post-conviction relief, which
follow:
1) Self-defense/actual innocence;
2) Ineffective assistance of counsel/conspiracy;
3) No investigator/investigation for defense;
4) No evidence against defendant;
5) Challenge of conviction, sentence, etc.;
6) US and state constitutional violations (see No.s 8 and 9 below);
7) Prosecutorial and appointed defense attorney (see No. 2 above)
misconduct;
8) Excessive unduly harsh sentence;
9) Illegal searches and seizures;
10) Perjury;
11) Miscarriage of justice;
12) Wanton and affirmative misconduct;
13) Bias/prejudice of state and defense attorneys;
14) Conspiracy of state and defense attorneys based on religion
and gender;
15) Duress by prosecution, mediator, and defense attorneys;
16) Actual substantial prejudice from delay of 2 filed petitions;
17) Prejudice through denial of case records;
18) Anything remembered after the fact.
Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss, p. 1-2. (R. p. 30-31.)
The grounds for the court's intended summary dismissal are as follows:
. . . . Notably, the petitioner's application is supported only by a
nine-page statement of facts. This does not amount to admissible
evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case as to each element
of Petitioner's numerous claims. In fact, Petitioner appears to have
listed an exceptionally wide array of claims, some of which she has
asserted in prior petitions and motions, supported only by her
description of the facts as she sees them.
Thus, Petitioner does not present adequate grounds upon which to
base a successive application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner is
hereby given twenty (20) days to reply to this proposed dismissal.
I.C. § 19-4906(6).
Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss, p. 2 (footnote omitted). (R. p. 31.)
The court did appoint counsel, ruling as follows:
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In the current petition, this Court has noted that the asserted claims
are unsupported by admissible evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie showing as to each element of her claims. This is due
and owing, in part, to the fact that she has essentially alleged every
potential ground for post-conviction relief available, and then some.
Additionally, Petitioner has been in prison since her sentencing in
1999, and it is therefore presumed that she has inadequate funds
with which to hire her own attorney. In an effort to provide Petitioner
with adequate resources to narrow her petition and present a
potentially valid claim, this Court will grant her motion for
appointment of counsel.
Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss, p. 4 (emphasis added). (R. p. 33.)
Counsel was appointed, who did file an amended successive petition for
post conviction relief.

(R. p. 42-48.) Counsel

also filed a motion requesting

additional time in order to have the Petitioner verify the petition, and the court
granted the motion. (R. p. 72, 76.)

Counsel then filed what was entitled Verified

Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief (hereinafter Verified
Amended Successive Petition). 1 (R. p. 78-85.)

As will be shown below, the

court noted that the petition wasn't actually verified, but it treated it as if it was.
Petitioner specifically alleged as follows in the Verified Amended
Successive Petition:
a. In Dunlap's filed Original Amended Petition, Dunlap failed to
verify the Original Amended Petition as required by Idaho Code §
19-4902(a).
b. In the Original Amended Petition, Dunlap failed to assert any
specific facts to support Petitioner's allegations of her underlying
ineffective assistance of counsel and merely offered bare and
conclusory assertions of the same.

Appellant notes that at first glance the instant record appears confusing
because the amended successive petition and verified amended successive
petition contain as attachments, the initial amended petition for post conviction
relief and the order dismissing it.
1
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c. Specifically, Dunlap failed to assert the following facts as to
Petitioner's underlying criminal case, which Petitioner hereby states
and asserts are true:
i. That on or about October 25, 1998, Petitioner was in her
ex-husband's house. At that time, her intention was to remove
some items which were hers from the house. Petitioner had placed
a .22 pistol, which belonged to Petitioner, on a kitchen counter in
the upstairs kitchen area of the house.
ii. That some time after arriving at the house, Petitioner's exhusband's girlfriend, Mata Jones ("Jones"), presented at the house.
Petitioner followed Jones downstairs in the house to inquire as to
why Jones was present there.
iii. Upon entering the downstairs area of the house, Jones
began to yell at Petitioner. As the Jones's yelling escalated, Jones
hit petitioner with a telephone which was in Jones' hand. The
impact caused a laceration on Petitioner's hand, and Petitioner's
hand began to bleed.
iv. Following the physical altercation with the phone, Jones
went back upstairs in the house. Petitioner then hung up the phone
with some force, as Jones had left it off the hook. Petitioner then
proceeded upstairs to see what Jones was doing.
v. Upon going upstairs, Petitioner could not locate Jones,
and Petitioner began to search for Jones. After some time,
Petitioner did not find Jones, and Petitioner returned to the kitchen
area of the house. At that time, Jones presented behind the
Petitioner.
vi. Jones began once again to yell at Jonas, which yelling
began to be more escalated. During Jones yelling, Jones told
Petitioner that she was going to marry Petitioner's ex-husband and
that all of Petitioner's prior possessions were going to soon belong
to Jones. Jones said, "Miles is mine, I've been fucking him for
years." Jones further stated that she would "own" Petitioner's
children and could do with the children as she pleased. Also during
the argument, Jones asserted that she was going to "do [Petitioner
and Petitioner's] children in".
vii. While Jones yelled at Petitioner, Jones regularly turned
her gaze toward Petitioner's .22 pistol that was located on the
countertop next to the kitchen sink. Jones was physically closer to
the pistol than Petitioner.
9

viii. At one point, Jones looked at the pistol, and Petitioner
stated, "Don't even think about it." At that time, Jones moved
quickly for the pistol, and Petitioner followed.
ix. Jones grabbed the pistol and began to point it towards
Petitioner. Petitioner was fearful for her life and the life of her
daughter who was downstairs because Petitioner believed that the
.22 bullet could go through the floor and hit her daughter.
x. Petitioner grabbed Jones's hand, which held the pistol, as
Jones pointed the pistol towards Petitioner. At that time, the pistol
discharged, and the bullet hit Jones in the face.
xi. Jones's body then fell forward, and her head landed near
Petitioner's feet. Petitioner saw that Jones was still breathing as
Jones made a sound with her breath. After a second of collecting
herself after the first shot, Petitioner proceeded to Jones's side to
investigate her breathing. As Petitioner proceeded to bend down
toward Jones's body, the pistol, which was loosely contained in
Petitioner's hand, accidentally discharged for a second time after
Petitioner's hand hit Petitioner's knee, which caused a .22 bullet to
hit Jones.
d. Also, specifically, Dunlap failed to assert the following facts as to
Petitioner's underlying criminal representation of Randy Stoker and
Marilyn Paul, which Petitioner hereby asserts are true:
i. Neither of Petitioner's counsel ever investigated the
aforementioned facts, despite the fact that an investigator was
approved by the Court. Specifically, Petitioner believes that such
investigation would have shown 1) bullet projections consistent with
Petitioner's above recited facts of how the pistol was shot on both
of the two discharges; 2) blood from Petitioner in the kitchen and in
the bed of Petitioner's daughter's pickup, consistent with
Petitioner's assertions that Jones initiated the first physical
altercation by hitting Petitioner with a phone; and 3) that Jones had
a quarrelsome, violent, dangerous and/or manipulative background,
consistent with Petitioner's assertion that Jones struck Petitioner,
threatened Petitioner's life and Petitioner's children's lives, and
Jones made the initial move toward the pistol during the argument
in the kitchen.
ii. In the event that an investigation was conducted in
Petitioner's underlying criminal case, Petitioner asserts that Dunlap
failed to argue that Petitioner's underlying criminal counsel failed to
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review the information obtained by any investigator. Petitioner
specifically alleges hereby that neither Stoker nor Paul ever
reviewed any information obtained by an investigator with her.
iii. Neither of Petitioner's underlying counsel advised
Petitioner of a potential self-defense or defense of others defense.
Specifically, Petitioner was never advised of the burden of proof on
a self-defense or defense of other defense in her alleged crime.
More specifically, Petitioner was never advised that at trial, the
burden would be on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the homicide of Jones was not justifiable and that if a
jury found that there is a reasonable doubt whether the homicide of
Jones was justifiable, the jury would be instructed that it must find
the defendant not guilty. In fact, Petitioner was led to believe that
she bore the burden of proving a self-defense or defense of others
defense in her case by her counsel.
e. Additionally, Dunlap failed to investigate and challenge the facts
as contained in the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report in this case,
as they contradict with the facts as contained herein. Specifically,
Dunlap should have challenged the following facts, which neither
Stoker nor Paul investigated or argued at the Petitioner's
sentencing: 1) that Petitioner's blood was at the scene in the
kitchen and in Petitioner's daughter's truck; 2) that Petitioner did not
have violent tendencies; and 3) that Petitioner never talked with any
outside party about the facts of the case, including but not limited to
the facts contained herein.
f. Dunlap failed to communicate with Petitioner to discover
Petitioner's desire to raise the foregoing facts and legal arguments
in her Original Post-Conviction Petition. As such, Dunlap's Original
Amended Petition summarily asserted that Petitioner "was not
being properly advised/informed of the procedures taking place in
her case" (emphasis added).
g. Had Dunlap rendered effective assistance as Petitioner's
counsel, by completing the acts as stated above, Dunlap would
have been able to effectively argue that Petitioner's counsel, Randy
Stoker and Marilyn Paul, in her underlying criminal case were
ineffective assistance to Petitioner.
h. Had Stoker and Paul provided effective assistance as counsel to
Petitioner, Petitioner would not have entered a guilty plea in this
matter and would have proceeded successfully on a self defense or
defense of others defense, after adequate investigation made on
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the underlying facts to support the facts as recited and contained
herein.
Verified Amended Successive Petition, p. 3-7. (R. p. 80-84.)
The state filed an answer to the Verified Amended Successive Petition
which admitted some allegations and denied others. More to the point, it raised
the following affirmative defenses:
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ONE
Petitioner's Successive Petition for Post-Conviction
untimely. I. C. § 19-4902.

Relief is

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TWO
Petitioner's Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief asserts
issues that were effectively waived by the Petitioner's plea of guilty.
I.C. § 19-4908
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE THREE
Petitioner's Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains
bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits,
records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails to raise a
genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code Sections 19-4902(a),
19-4903, and 19-4906.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FOUR
Petitioner' s Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief are
clearly disproved by the record; and under such circumstances,
Petitioner's allegations are insufficient for the granting of relief.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FIVE
Petitioner's Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief could
and should have been raised on direct appeal. As a result, such
allegations are forfeited and may not be considered in postconviction proceedings. Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b ).
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE SIX
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
unsubstantiated by facts that support her claim that her counsel's
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that Petitioner was prejudiced by his attorney's deficient
performance. Wherefore Petitioner's claim fails for sufficiency.
Answer, p. 1-2. (R. p. 108-109.)
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The court then

issued its order dismissing successive petition for post

conviction relief. (R. p. 112-119.) Shortly thereafter it

issued its amended order

dismissing successive petition for post conviction relief. (R. p. 121-131.) It began
by repeating its recitation of the procedural history from its notice of intent to
dismiss. (R. p. 121-122.) The court continued by explaining:
Finally, on May 12, 2011, Petitioner filed the current successive
petitioner for post-conviction relief (Jerome County Case No. CV2011-559). On May 2, 2012, following the Court's Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, which granted Petitioner's request for court-appointed
counsel, Petitioner filed her Amended Successive Petition for Post
Conviction Relief, followed by a Verified Amended Successive
Petition for Post Conviction Relief1 filed on June 12, 2012, with
[Footnote]
1 Aside from the verification by Petitioner and some
amended language, specifically roman iv. on page 4, the
Verified Petition is the same as the original Amended
Petition filed on May 2, 2012. Additionally, Petitioner's
verification signature was not notarized. This is an error that
the Court will disregard for purposes of this Order, which
addresses the merits of Petitioner's claims.
leave from the Court. Thereafter, on June 13, 2012, the State filed
its Answer to Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction
Relief.
Petitioner's original successive petition stated eighteen grounds for
post-conviction relief, many of which had already been raised in
prior motions or were not actionable claims under the Uniform Post
Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA). The original petition was
supported only by Petitioner's statement of facts. This Court
addressed the original successive petition in its Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, which is incorporated herein by reference. The Amended
Petition condensed these claims into one multi part claim of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, which will be
addressed in this opinion.
Amended Order, p. 2-3. (R. p. 122-123.)
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After explaining the ordinary standards for a post conviction relief petition
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the court continued as follows:
On the other hand, there is no constitutionally protected right to the
effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction relief
proceedings. Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902 (Ct.App. 1995).
Thus, such an allegation, in and of itself, is not among the
permissible grounds for post-conviction relief. See Griffin v. State,
142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct.App. 2006); Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337,
339 (Ct.App. 1987). Ineffective ass1stance of prior post-conviction
counsel may, however, provide sufficient reason for permitting
newly-asserted allegations or allegations inadequately raised in the
initial petition to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction petition.
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189 (Ct.App. 2008); See a/so
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596 (1981); Hernandez v. State,
133 Idaho 794, 798 (1999). Failing to provide a post-conviction
petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims
presented may be violative of due process. Schwartz, 145 Idaho at
189; Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 799; See a/so Abbott v. State, 129
Idaho 381,385 (Ct.App. 1996); Mellingerv. State, 113 Idaho 31, 35
(Ct.App. 1987).
Under I.C. § 19-4908, summary dismissal of a successive petition
for post-conviction relief on the basis of waiver, under I.C. § 194908, is only appropriate where the court finds that the successive
petition failed to include newly-asserted grounds for relief in the
prior post-conviction proceeding without sufficient reason. I.C. § 194908; Hernandez, 133 Idaho 794. All grounds for relief available to
a petitioner under the UPCPA must be raised in a petitioner's
original, supplemental, or amended petition. I.C. § 19-4908. The
language of I.C. § 19-4908 prohibits successive petitions in those
cases where the petitioner "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently"
waived the grounds for relief sought in the successive petition or
offers "no sufficient reason" for omitting those grounds in the
original petition. See Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593 (1981).
However, I.C. § 19-4908 allows a petitioner to raise a ground for
relief, which was addressed in a former petition, if he or she can
demonstrate sufficient reason why the claim was inadequately
raised or presented in the initial post-conviction petition. See
Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 798.
Petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of counsel in her initial
petition; the Court does not find that she has asserted new grounds
for relief in this petition. Therefore the issue is whether Petitioner

14

has demonstrated sufficient reason why her
inadequately raised or presented in the first petition.

claims

were

In the current petition, Petitioner alleges that her previous postconviction attorney, M. Lynn Dunlap, failed to verify the Amended
Petition, failed to assert any specific facts to support her allegations
that counsel gave ineffective assistance in the underlying criminal
case, failed to assert facts which Petitioner asserts are true, and
failed to adequately communicate with her regarding the facts and
legal arguments contained in the original petition. Petitioner has not
supported her claim with anything other than a copy of the Order
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief entered on August
26, 2008 and a copy of the original Amended Petition for Postconviction Relief, filed by Mr. Dunlap on November 27, 2007.
Notably, in the original amended petition, Mr. Dunlap attached
fourteen exhibits in support of Petitioner's claims. The exhibits were
letters she had written, including correspondence with the Idaho
State Bar regarding a bar complaint she filed against Ms. Paul and
Mr. Stoker, correspondence from Mr. Stoker regarding the status of
his representation of her, and a letter to Judge Carlson expressing
her concerns about counsel's representation of her. As previously
stated, a claim for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
is not grounds for post-conviction relief; at most it may amount to a
sufficient reason for courts to re-examine an original post-conviction
petition for newly-asserted allegations or allegations inadequately
raised. In sum, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficient
reason why her claims were inadequately raised or presented in the
initial post-conviction petition. Significantly, Petitioner had two
evidentiary hearings on her Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
Petitioner also appears to have had multiple opportunities to
present admissible evidence that her counsel was ineffective under
the UPCPA. Therefore, summary dismissal of petitioner's
successive petition on the basis of waiver is appropriate.
Amended Order, p. 4-6 (footnote ommitted, emphasis added). (R. p. 124-126.)
Despite dismissing the petition on procedural grounds, the court went on
to brief address Petitioner's assertion regarding counsel in the underlying
criminal case:
The Petitioner claims counsel in her underlying criminal case,
Randy Stoker and Marilyn Paul, failed to adequately investigate
facts that petitioner has asserted as true. She alleges that there
was either no investigation done in the underlying criminal case, or
15

that any information obtained by an investigator was not reviewed
by original counsel and was thereby not reviewed by her.

Petitioner has not met her burden of showing prejudice. Petitioner
essentially raised this same claim; that she was inadequately
advised regarding evidence, in her original petition. In his Order
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, entered August 26,
2008, Judge Daniel C. Hurlbutt stated the following:
Petitioner asserts, as she did in her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea, that she was not presented with the state's
evidence against her and that she therefore could not have
entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. The
district court, in considering her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea, addressed the merits of this contention. Specifically,
the court highlighted the fact that the petitioner was present
at her preliminary hearing and heard the evidence presented
by the state at that hearing. The court also noted that the
defendant was present at all or nearly all of the hearings on
the admissibility of evidence against her. The court, after
hearing evidence on the motion, denied the motion.
While it is true that the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial
on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the motion in the first place, the fact remains that
the record created by the proceedings on the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea conclusively establishes that the
defendant was aware of the evidence against her and
entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea.
Furthermore, the petitioner herself in her petition for postconviction relief admitted that she did go over evidence with
at least Ms. Paul. ... This combined with the facts
established in the record directly rebut the petitioner's
allegation that her guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent due to failure by counsel to inform the
petitioner of the evidence against her. For that reason, the
petitioner has failed to establish facts which would entitle her
to relief.
Order Dismissing, pp. 4-5. Petitioner is required to show prejudice
in asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, in
her current petition, she states only that:
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Had Stoker and Paul provided effective assistance as
counsel to Petitioner, Petitioner would not have entered a
guilty plea in this matter and would have proceeded
successfully on a self defense or defense of others defense,
after adequate investigation made on the underlying facts to
support the facts as recited and contained herein.
The Court finds that Petitioner's recitation of facts followed by a
conclusory statement that she would not have pied guilty had
counsel performed an adequate investigation into the facts she put
forth, amount to nothing more than conclusory allegations,
previously raised and adjudicated and unsupported by admissible
evidence, and conclusions of law, which this Court is not required
to accept. It is therefore appropriate for this Court to summarily
dismiss Petitioner's successive petition without an evidentiary
hearing. This is especially true in light of the numerous
opportunities petitioner has been afforded to bring forth admissible
evidence to support her claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Further, there is nothing in the evidence to support
Petitioner's contention that her claims were inadequately raised in
the initial post-conviction relief petition. Therefore, Petitioner's
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief is hereby
DISMISSED.
Amended Order, p. 7-8. (R. p. 127-128.)

C.

The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the Petition
In short, the court erred because it dismissed the petition on different

grounds than those raised in the notice of intent to dismiss or the state's answer.
While the court dismissed the petition because Petitioner failed to establish a
sufficient reason allowing the filing of a successive petition, the court's notice of
intent to dismiss (and state's answer) complained only about the evidentiary
insufficiency of the

claims contained in the petition.

In other words, the

Petitioner was told only of factual insufficiency, not legal insufficiency.
The grounds for the court's intended summary dismissal are again
follows:
17

as

. . . . Notably, the petitioner's application is supported only by a
nine-page statement of facts. This does not amount to admissible
evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case as to each element
of Petitioner's numerous claims. In fact, Petitioner appears to have
listed an exceptionally wide array of claims, some of which she has
asserted in prior petitions and motions, supported only by her
description of the facts as she sees them.
Thus, Petitioner does not present adequate grounds upon which to
base a successive application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner is
hereby given twenty (20) days to reply to this proposed dismissal. I.
C. § 19-4906(6).
Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss, p. 2 (footnote omitted). (R. p. 31.)
In response, the verified amended successive petition went to great
lengths to provide Petitioner's statement as to the facts surrounding the crime, as
well as discussed the facts of the representation of both trial counsel and initial
post conviction counsel.
But in its Amended Order (and not its Notice of Intent to Dismiss), the
court framed the issue as follows: "Therefore the issue is whether Petitioner has
demonstrated sufficient reason why her claims were inadequately raised or
presented in the first petition." And of course, following its discussion of the law
related to successive petitions, the court held that sufficient reason had not been
shown.
Nor was this ground for dismissal

raised in the state's answer to the

petition. While the state certainly complained that the prose successive petition
was factually insufficient, it never suggested that the problem was that it did not
sufficiently describe the sufficient reason why the successive petition could be
brought in the first place.
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In its well established in Idaho that the Petitioner must receive notice of
the grounds for the proposed dismissal and an opportunity to respond to any
deficiencies of the petition. This principle has been discussed in many Idaho
cases, and is succinctly summarized in DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599 (2009):
The district court cannot dismiss claims on its own motion if it does
not give the parties a twenty-day prior notice stating its reasons for
doing so as required by Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b). Garza v. State.
Likewise, if the State moves to dismiss a petition under Idaho Code
§ 19-4906(c), the court cannot dismiss a claim on a ground not
asserted by the State in its motion unless the court gives the
twenty-day notice required by Section 19-4906(b). Saykhamchone
v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). A district
judge also errs in dismissing a petition where the State does not
allege any grounds for the dismissal, other than "Idaho Code §§ 194901 et seq." Id.
Id., p. 602.
In our case,

the Petitioner was never put on notice that the threshold

issue was the legal question of whether she had demonstrated sufficient reason
allowing the bringing of the successive petition. Thus, the summary dismissal
on this basis was error and must be reversed and the matter remanded to the
district court.
Further, the dismissal cannot be upheld on the alternative grounds where
the court purports to address the merits. The court incorrectly equates the claim
from her initial petition, to wit,

that her attorneys failed to advise her of the

evidence, with the claim in her instant petition, to wit, that her attorneys failed to
investigate and so were unaware of the evidence. Further, the court fails to
explain why Petitioner's lengthy statement of facts which it treated as verified
would not be admissible evidence supporting her claim.
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To summarize, the order of summary dismissal must be reversed since it
relied on grounds different from those in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss or the
state's answer. What's more, the dismissal cannot be upheld under the
alternative merits ruling because it does not actually address the merits, and in
any event, does not consider the Petitioner's evidence.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore,

for the

as

reasons

stated

above,

Appellant/Petitioner

respectfully requests that the district court's summary denial of the post
conviction petition be reversed and that this matter be remanded for an
evidentiary hearing.
DATED this2lday of March, 2013.
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